In the November issue of Farshteinen it was suggested that the rumoured contents of the yet-to-be released peace proposal known as the “Geneva Initiative”, appeared to align very closely with what a majority, of Jews - both inside and outside of Israel have always appeared to accept as the basis for a permanent peace between Israel and the Palestinians. It was further suggested that since it was unlikely that either the Sharon government or the PLO would accept the proposal. This left individual Jews, (and Palestinians), with a choice. A very important choice.
Given the importance of a peace settlement to all Jews and to the Jewish nation as a collectivity and assuming that the proposal actually contained most of what it was rumoured to contain - each individual Jew would have to decide whether to leave the future of this agreement to others to determine or, instead, to become actively involved in its support and in seeking ways to see it implemented -regardless of the positions of the Sharon government and the PLO leadership.
Within days of that column being published, very similar sentiments were echoed elsewhere, (see: Opp. Ed. article by Shira Herzog in the November 2nd issue of the Globe and Mail), and polls reported that more than 40% of Israelis supported the as-yet-unreleased proposal. At the same time, support for this and similar proposals was forthcoming from some important, albeit surprising sources - including senior members of the US administration, (see: Ron Kampeas article entitled: “ Wolfowitz support for new petition could give key push to grass-roots peace effort” carried by JTA News Service on November 3rd - www.jta.org)
The Geneva Accord
In the middle of November the Israeli daily, “Haaretz” published a draft version of the “Geneva Initiative”, (now known as the “Geneva Accord”).
If there is one overriding fault with the design of the Accord, as it now stands, it is its incredible complexity. Implementing any peace in the Middle East would, undoubtedly, be an exacting process, but, before this can even be attempted the proposal itself must attract support from a very wide community of opinion and that, in turn, requires that its basic principles be very clear, meaningful and memorable.
It would, perhaps, have been useful if those who developed the Accord had remembered that the Ten Commandments were written on two stone tablets, that Churchill and Roosevelt were able to sum up much of what we were fighting for in WWII with a statement of “Four Principles”, etc. Alas they did not.
The complexity of the Accord itself is, unfortunately, more than matched by an incredibly intricate web of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian-International committees, commissions, groups, mechanisms, etc. called for its operationalization. In its current version, the Accord contains 17articles, (four of which have yet to be written), covers twenty five pages and leaves a number of matters whose resolution is key to any peace proposal to an unspecified number of annexes whose ultimate length will surely surpass that of the Accord itself by a factor of 10 or more.
If there is one overriding fault with the substance of the Accord, it is the failure to recognize that peace between Israel and a future Palestinian state goes beyond the interest of those two states per se and impacts, very definitely, on the much larger number of Jews who are not citizens of Israel and on the Jewish nation as a whole. (This is probably true of Palestinians and of the Palestinian nation as well - but I will confine my comments in this regard to Jews and the Jewish nation.)
All of this notwithstanding, it is, incumbent on us to tease out the essential elements of the Accord and attempt a preliminary critique.
Overall Purpose - the Accord is to “...(mark)the historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis, and (pave) the way to reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel...”) (Preamble)
Our one point of disagreement is the lack of reference to individual Jews everywhere and to the Jewish nation.
Two-State Solution - Creation of two, sovereign states, one Palestinian and one Israeli, characterized by mutual recognition and a detailed commitment to peace and cooperation. (Preamble and specific parts of various Accord articles)
Total agreement.
Recognition as Homelands - Parties to the Accord “... recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The Parties are committed not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.”, (Article 1)
The concept of “national homeland” is so central that its implications should be accorded somewhat more prominence and the principle that the status of Israel and Palestine as homelands shall not be comprised by any other aspect of the Accord - eg., resolution of refugee issue, right of return, requirement to specifically eschew anti-Semitism, etc. - should be included here as a specific consequence of this concept. Its statement in Article 1 is far too brief and somewhat lost within a long list of other, much less basic requirements for peace.
Peace, Security - Mutual commitments to: maintain the peace and respect each other’s sovereignty; reject and condemn terrorism and violence in all its forms; refrain from actions and policies that are liable to nurture extremism and create conditions conducive to terrorism on either side. Limitation of Palestinian security forces to a sub-military level. Promulgation and enforcement of laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence, etc.,etc.” (Preamble, Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, )
Total agreement - provisions for peace and security are very detailed and adequately reflect the obvious importance of this requirement in their comprehensiveness and practicality.
International Involvement - the Accord’s implementation to be overseen, chiefly, by an international “Implementation and Verification Group” composed of the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN plus a “multi-national force” whose means of establishment and composition are yet to be unspecified. (Chiefly in: Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and in specific parts of various other articles)
Probably a necessary evil. But , as the Israeli experience with the UN has shown, it is not possible to guarantee that foreign states and international institutions will not permit their own interests to override those of the task at hand. Nothing is more difficult to achieve than long-standing multi-national cooperation in matters of this type and although laudable in theory, it might be advisable to reduce the dependence on external parties as far as possible and to seek means of substituting the self-interests and commitment of parties directly involved instead. World War II Allies found it nearly impossible to maintain cooperation even in the face of what may arguably be described as the greatest common danger any or all of them ever faced.
Borders - acceptance of the pre-1967 war borders with specific, minor modifications designed to meet practical problems. (Articles 4, 6, )
Total agreement - although some of the minor modifications referred to have yet to be negotiated or are not as clearly stated as might be desired.
Settlements - transfer of Israeli settlements in West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian authority and re-settlement of occupants within Israel. (Article 4)
Total agreement - although acceptance will be obviously opposed by some segments of the Israeli population and its implementation difficult, it is a sine qua non and the Accord has reflected this in the detail and practicality of measures and procedures laid down.
Palestinian “Contiguity” - establishment of a communications corridor between West Bank and Gaza portions of the new Palestinian state - under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian operational administration. (Article 4)
Total agreement
Jerusalem - Division of Jerusalem including Old City, provision for establishment of Israel and Palestinian national capitals in their respective portions; Palestinian sovereignty over Temple Mount, Israeli sovereignty over Wailing Wall, The Mount of Olives - together with detailed provisions for protection of, and access to, religious sites and the coordination/cooperation required for effective functioning of the city. (Article 6)
Total agreement together with admiration of efforts made to cut what is truly a Gordian knot.
Refugees - International determination of refugee status for Palestinian claimants and financial compensation entitlements - paid partly by Israel and partly by an international, voluntary contributory fund set up for this purpose for both “property loss” and undefined “refugeehood”. Additional financial remuneration for ,(unspecified), states that have “hosted” Palestinian refugees. Determination, by Israel, of the number of refugees to be allowed to return there, (but to be justified in light of numbers accepted by so-called “third countries”). Determination of ultimate residence of Palestinian refugees by international body subject to desires of individual refugees and willingness of Israel, (see: above), present “host states” and “third countries” to accept refugees . (Article 7)
Partial agreement - Some of the principles enunciated in this article, (necessity of settling refugee situation as a basic part of any peace agreement, “free and informed choice by Palestinian refugees as to preferred place of permanent residence - subject to willingness of Israel, “host states” and “third countries” to accept them, and acceptance of the value of any infrastructure transferred when Israeli settlements are abandoned as a contribution to the cost of refugee re-settlement by Israel, etc., are reasonable - but several other aspects of what is being proposed in this agreement would appear to be much less so. These are: (a) the concept that all the refugees created as the result of a war, (in this case the 1948 Jewish - Arab war), are created by one side only and that all people recognized as refugees are, also, from one side only; (b) too many refugee provisions have been left to further negotiations and/or are far too ambiguous, (c) the lack of specific recognition that any requirement on Israel to accept Palestinian refugees as Israeli citizens impacts on Israel’s status as a Jewish homeland, (d) the impracticality of settling refugee claims or of providing funding for economic development of a future Palestinian state on the basis of individual compensation entitlements - generally and, in particular: (i) the lack of provision for compensation to Jewish refugees from Arab countries, (ii) no recognition of responsibility of other Arab countries - many of which would presumably be considered “host states” - in contributing to any “compensation fund”, (iii), the ambiguous nature of the concept of“refugeehood”.
Major Matters Omitted from Current Draft - the division and control of water resources has yet to be included within the terms of the Accord.
Conclusion
Until remaining parts of the Accord are completed and the concerns noted with respect to “refugees” have been addressed, it is not possible to advocate full support for this particular peace proposal. However, it and others similar to it, would appear to approach what is required, in the minds of many, if not most, Jews for a practical and just resolution to the current conflict. That being said, the question of working to establish support for this or a similar proposal independent of the policies of the Sharon government or the PLO must be actively considered
