Farshteinen began with, and largely because of, the conviction that the current conflict in the Middle East was intimately connected to anti-Semitism and, because of that was of very direct interest to, and had very considerable impact on, Jews - whether Israeli or not.

In its simplest form, the basis for this contention was that there would have been peace in the Middle East had the concept of an internationally recognized Jewish homeland been accepted by the Palestinian leadership and the Arab states of the region. Put another way, the UN’s basic solution for peace in the region - viz.: creation of two national states, one Jewish and the other Palestinian was, at the time, acceptable to the majority of Jews, there and elsewhere, and would have worked had not the other side decided that there could be no recognition of any state that was a Jewish Homeland. To this was added the assertion that the roots of anti-Semitism, in the Middle East as well as Europe and elsewhere, is ultimately and inevitably connected to the refusal to accept Jews as a nation and not just as a particular religious group whose members were deserving of the same individual status and rights as others

If the contention that recognition of Jews as a nationality, or lack thereof, lies at the heart of anti-Semitism and, even more so, if peace in the Middle East requires not only the establishment of two national states but, also, an eradication of anti-Semitism - then peace in the Middle East is of direct interest to Jews everywhere and Jews everywhere have a genuine right to participate in the determination of that peace - should it become a real possibility.

Two weeks ago we were told that a group made up of prominent Israelis and Palestinians had reached agreement, on the basis for a lasting peace in the region. We are told that they had done this independently of the current Sharon government and, for the most part if not entirely, of the current PLO leadership as well.

Apparently, the actual terms of the proposal, (known as the “Geneva Initiative”), agreed to by this bipartite group will not be made known until the anniversary of the death Yitzhak Rabin in early November. However, the broad outlines of the agreement have been made known informally and are said to compromise the following:

(a) creation of two states, one Israeli and the other Arab

(b) specific recognition of these as national states - or as homelands of the Jewish and Palestinian nations respectively - a character which is to be reflected in their make-up and constitution

(c) a regulation of the question of “refugees” - whether Jews who were driven/fled from Arab states since 1948 or of Arabs who were driven/fled from Israel during or after its creation - without the institution of any wholesale “right of return” or “compensation” that would detract from the character of these two states as set out in (b), above

(d) mutually recognized boundaries that would be essentially those of Israel and the West Bank/Gaza just prior to the 1967 war with minor modifications that would provide Israel with some reasonable guarantee of strategic security - eg., leaving it in control of militarily important positions around Jerusalem and between Jerusalem and the remainder of Israel that would negate any easy re-institution of the siege of Jerusalem as occurred during the 1948 war and, similarly, leave a Palestinian state that had geographic integrity and the basic for economic viability.

(e) a compromise on the “Jerusalem question” that would leave Israel in control of the western part of the city, as well as most of the “Wailing Wall”, the “Old City” and the new Palestinian state with similar control over the Al Aqsa mosque and immediate surroundings as well as a portion of East Jerusalem bordering on the West Bank.

(f) an end to propagation of, or support/tolerance of institutionalized anti-Semitism.

If the above should, indeed, constitute the basis of the peace proposal, it would agree, in very large measure with the principles for a peace settlement set out in the December 2002 Farshteinen. This would not vindicate any incredible insight on the part of Yours Truly so much as provide support for the contention that it is the willingness to implement and not the essential content of any peace treaty which is the main obstacle to peace.

More importantly, should the six attributes set out above form the basis of the peace proposal, it would mean that our basic contention - viz.: that the conflict is as much about the recognition of nationalities as it is a matter of boundaries, “refugees”, etc. This, in turn, means that Jews world wide, (and, for that matter, Palestinians residing outside the Middle East), have a major stake in the peace proposal and a very legitimate role to play in determining the fate of the proposal.

Should contents of the peace proposal be even close to what is rumoured, it is highly unlikely that the Sharon government or the PLO will accept it or, work honestly toward its implementation. In that case, Jews and Palestinians, not represented by the Government of Israel or the PLO who support the proposal or its essential elements will have a very basic choice to make - either ignore the very real interest they have in the peace proposal and its realization and leave the ultimate decision to the Sharon government and/or the PLO, or, assert that interest and work for its implementation - regardless of the position they are likely to take.

If the latter, Jews and Palestinians alike will have to do something they have never done before - viz.: speak up as members of the two nations whose fate is so clearly and directly tied to attainment of peace in the Middle East and not allow the current Government of Israel and PLO leadership derail what those who formulated the peace proposal have started. This means we will have to change from interested spectators to active participants.

Just how to do this and do it effectively is something we must begin to ponder.