Since its beginnings in the nineteenth century, the left and, in particular the social democratic left has struggled with “Jewish Question”. Its position on the status of Jews, on their right to enjoy equal rights, etc. dates back to an earlier time when radical thinking was represented by what might be called “rational liberalism”.

One the one hand, the obvious persecution of Jews and Judaism that existed, at some time or other, throughout most of Europe led democrats to develop a certain sympathy for the cause of Jews. In most instances, this took the form of support for Jewish emancipation - ie., the granting of equal social and political status to individuals. On the other, there was often suspicion and even hostility toward the notion of recognition for Jews as a nation. With the emergence of socialism as the leading edge of radical, egalitarian thinking, the opposition to nationalism, (which was always suspect, a distraction - more or less deliberate - from the central struggle between classes), the suspicion and hostility became, if anything, stronger.

This dualistic position on “the Jewish question” can be summed up in a famous declaration issued by the Revolutionary Council of France in 1791- ie.: “For the Jews as individuals - everything; for the Jews as a people - nothing.”

Throughout the history of the “left” - whether as rational liberalism or socialism - Jews have played a prominent role and, the dualism remained. Since the second half of the nineteenth century this dualism led to the differences between Jews who supported some form of socialism and argued that all forms of nationalism, including Jewish nationalism, should be opposed as an obstacle toward achievement of a just, egalitarian society and those who supported the remainder of the radical cause but, insisted that an egalitarian society should accommodate, and not seek to eradicate ethnic, cultural nationalism and the identity that comes with it.

In previous issues of Farshteinen I have argued that it is impossible for Jews to retain their identity as Jews without their recognizing Judaism as a nationality as well as a religion. I have also argued that it has been the determination of Jews to retain their ethnic nationality, despite the lack of a homeland, that led to anti-Semitism. If this analysis is correct, then the creation and continued existence of the State of Israel - which has become the manifestation of a Jewish homeland - is intimately tied to the question of anti-Semitism, whether directed toward Jews resident in Israel or anywhere else.

With the intensification of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the old issue of anti-Semitism, (ie., the treatment of individual Jews), and a Jewish homeland, (ie. the modern State of Israel), has re-surfaced. On the left, whether because of opposition to the right wing policies of recent Israeli governments, because of sympathy for the suffering of ordinary Palestinians, or other reasons - there has developed a clear pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli bias.

It is, of course, possible for anyone to oppose the policies of particular governments, including the government of Israel, without opposing the notion of a Jewish homeland, or of the anti-Semitism such opposition would, I have argued, entail. However, the subtleties of this difference and the intimate connection between support for Israel as the homeland of the Jewish nation and equality for Jews is not widely understood among the non-Jewish left.

A very good example of this problem, of this confusion of opposition to Israeli government policies and/or support for legitimate goals of the Palestinians with positions that are anti-Israel and, as such, anti-Semitic - is represented by the resolution on the middle east adopted by the Socialist International, (a federation of social democratic parties) in 2002. This resolution has since been accepted by many social democratic parties - including the New Democratic Party of Canada - and my criticisms of it are presented below for your consideration.

1.0 The Socialist International, (S.I.), hereby announces that its member parties the Israeli Labour Party, Meretz and Fatah agree that the mutual recognition of the state of Israel and the state of Palestine, as two states to live side by side, should be the initial commitment before negotiations start between the two peoples.

1.1 The resolution is very misleading. The Israeli Labour Party may agree with the principle of two states - but it does not agree with the rest of this policy statement and, yet, this phraseology tends to give the impression that it does.

2.0 The main elements of a final settlement have long been clear to most involved parties: implementation of Security Council resolution 242; establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel under irreversible security guarantees for both sides; borders ensuring that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the Palestinian state, but opening the possibility of negotiated land swaps; both states to have their capital in Jerusalem, and a just solution to the refugee issue.

2.1 When discussing the UN role regarding Israel, it is imperative to begin with the 1947 resolution which decreed that two national states, one Jewish and the other Palestinian, be established within the territory referred to as Palestine. Starting with a resolution passed after the 1967 war is another example of how critics of Israel often attempt to place the discussion in an a-historical context - something which detracts from anyone’s understanding of the situation. It is also very, very unlikely that “most parties involved” ever accepted Resolution 242.

2.2 Exactly what was to comprise the two states is separate, (and much less important than), the principle of establishing two national states. Once that principle is accepted, the exact borders of the two states and related matters should be discussed separately. “Land swaps” are a part of a secondary, albeit important, discussion. They too must be put in a historical, (and logical), context such as ----‘ in order to help ensure the practical security of these two states, land swaps are to be accepted as a means of attempting to provide a practical basis for security,’ etc.

2.3 “Irreversible security guarantees”, etc. should apply to all UN recognized states, not just the two envisioned in 1947. Their inclusion in a policy statement seems to add some credibility that such security can not be taken for granted.

2.4 The so-called “refugee issue” is far, far too important to be left as it is in this statement. Again, a historical context is essential - ie., how did the refugee issue arise, does it apply to Jewish refugees from Arab and other Moslem countries in the region or just to Palestinian refugees? What is the definition of a refugee?, etc.

3.0 The S.I. and its above mentioned member parties stress that negotiations have to be opened immediately and handle all outstanding issues. A cease fire cannot be a condition to the start of negotiations. Extremists cannot be given the upper hand. The above parties renounce violence and will refrain from participating in any violent activity that harms civilian lives. Firm measures must be taken against such acts. We ask the parties to pay particular attention to the protection of the civilian population.
No comment.

4.0 The Israeli Labour Party, Meretz and Fatah will immediately engage in confidence building activities together, with the help and support of the S.I. and member parties. Joint groups will be established to discuss and prepare specific issues that will come up within the framework of final status negotiations.

4.1 It is strange to have a policy statement which refers to only one faction of the PLO and, somewhat difficult to agree that Fatah is to be regarded as a democratic party, socialist or not.

5.0 The S.I. will work with the aim of encouraging the United States, Russia and the European Union to find a common stand on final status issues. This stand must be consistent with international legality, and enjoy the support of the UN Security Council. It must also allow concerned Arab states to adhere to it. Particularly, it must take into consideration the parameters included in the recent Saudi initiative.

5.1 Why should a policy deciding the future of Israel require agreement of the US, Russia, and the European Union or, for that matter, anybody other than Israel and Palestinian representatives? Secondly, tying the future of Israel to a particular proposal that Saudi Arabia has made is, to say the least, difficult to justify.

6.0 This basic common position should be elaborated before an international peace conference with the participation of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, relevant Arab countries, the U.S., EU, Russia and the UN.

6.1 That Israel’s future be decided by the PLO, “relevant Arab countries”, etc., is unacceptable. The proposal would put Israel’s future in the hands of a group that includes countries that have maintained a state of war with it for 60 years, others, (e.g., Russia and many members of the European Union), with a very long and bloody history of anti-Semitism, plus the UN which, as demonstrated again and again, has maintained a very obvious anti-Israel policy from 1948, (when it did nothing in the face of an invasion of Israel, whose creation it, itself, had called for), to 1967, (when it quickly removed UN observers from the borders of Israel at the request of several Arab states which had announced their intention of destroying Israel and pushing Jews into the sea), to 2001 when it organized an orgy of anti-Semitism in the name of a conference on racism.

7.0 The parties to the conflict should be invited to the Conference on the basis of basic principles: land for peace, 242, and an agreement on the establishment of two states and security for both. The Conference should set a timetable for final status negotiations.

7.1 Any policy justification whose historical basis begins with the aftermath of the 1967 war and ignores everything, - including who started that war and which international institution acted, at the behest of enemies of Israel, to facilitate its inauguration - that came before that, is unacceptable.

8.0 The S.I. also encourages our member parties who are parties in conflict to prepare their respective public opinions for a compromise. Israel may not have peace and at the same time keep settlements, while Palestinians may have to accept an internationally supported compromise on the refugee issue.

8.1 Maintenance of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is an important issue. The status and future of “refugees” - both Jewish and Palestinians - is another. Both are crucial to establishing a basis for peace. It would, therefore, seem only reasonable that any policy statement on the middle east deal with both in a much more specific and detailed fashion.

9.0 The S.I. supports the idea of building an international Fund for the Palestinian refugees, which the UN could administer once a permanent political settlement has been achieved on this issue. The Fund should ensure compensation for the losses and the suffering of the refugees, and provide them with the opportunity to start a new life on the basis of the conclusion of a final peace agreement. The better we can show that solutions are within reach, the more likely people will start working for a political settlement rather than a military one.

9.1 There is no reason not to include financial support for refugees in a peace proposal. There is, however, considerable reason to restrict such support to Palestinian refugees It would also be useful to make some recommendations as to how such financial support would be funded and distributed.

10.0 Urgent recovery and reconstruction programs for the Palestinian Authority are needed, including the recovery of taxes, customs and other fees still withheld. Development and security are dependent upon developing democratic institutions and establishing a centralized security authority.

10.1 The remission of taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority as part of previous agreements signed by the two parties would seem to be a reasonable policy position. However, whether such remission should await creation of a democratic governing structure within the Palestinian Authority is another issue. Again, it would appear reasonable in principle - albeit somewhat impractical - given the history of democracy within that institution plus all other Arab states.

11.0 The S.I. insists on the need for international guarantees, international monitoring of implementation of any agreements, international political follow up of negotiations, and the presence on the ground of a multinational peace keeping force patrolling borders.

11.1 Such specific demands go far beyond what exists in other parts of the world. At most, a general policy statement might advocate that effective measures be agreed to which would help obviate future wars, attacks on each others citizens, etc. While international support would be helpful, history has shown that Israel cannot rely on anyone other than itself to guarantee its security.