The Roadmap to Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Clever New Route to the Long Sought After Prize of Peace In the Middle East - It Ain’t....But Still
At the conclusion of the war in Iraq the US, presumably with the agreement of its three partners in what is called: “The Quartet”, (ie., the US, the European Union, Russia and the UN), issued what is formally entitled: “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”. For those who have struggled so long to find a resolution to the middle east conflict and, equally important, to convince all concerned that such a resolution was both necessary and possible - there is only one real question. Can it succeed?
Although only six pages long, (including preamble), “The Roadmap” is not what anyone wanting clear directions to reach a specific destination would want. In fact, it is unclear, repetitive, very poorly written, (use of the word “roadmap” is only the first of a surprising number of grammatical errors that, together with a rather helter-skelter style, leaves one with a vaguely uneasy feeling as to the coherence of its underlying ideas and the ability of its authors to ever provide the world with a clear idea of what is being proposed and thus garner general support for its goals), and almost totally uninspiring. Still....
Before reading the document one would almost automatically have expected: a statement of underlying principles, a clear description of the ultimate objective and the presentation of a process for going from the one to the other. Instead, all three of these elements are jumbled together.
In reality, there is no statement of principles. There is a reasonably clear, although rather cryptic statement of objectives, (ie., “... a (negotiated) settlement (resulting) in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors...”). The process for realizing these objectives consists of a rather long, somewhat vague series of actions - some applying to Israel or the Palestinian Authority, some to both, some to the two plus “The Quartet”, etc.
Were the steps more logically sequenced and more clearly described one would have expected them to be numbered and set forth in an orderly fashion. Instead, the only organization to “The Roadmap” is a division into three, vaguely described “phases”.
Principles
A simple, readily understood but nonetheless comprehensive statement of principles to underlie an eventual agreement might be something along the lines of the following: - adherence to a two national state model and prohibition of anything that would detract from either's status as national homelands - borders essentially along those of 1967 together with adjustments required to increase practicality of security measures and economic develop for the two states - equal treatment for Jews as well as Arabs in any plan to compensate or otherwise resolve the "refugee issue" - specific provisions for agreements on water sharing and usage along the lines that have been developed ever since 1948 - full and proper international recognition of Israel as an equal member of the world community - including fair treatment by, and within, the UN, an end to the tolerance of states of war, boycotts, etc. against Israel by other UN members, - enunciation of an official, international position against racism, including anti-Semitism, that would have enforcement measures, (sanctions, boycotts, etc.), in accordance with existing UN declarations, agreed to by Israel, and all Arab and Moslem states in the region
Assuming these were acceptable to the governments of Israel and the Palestinian state, at least four, (nos. 1,2,5 &6), could be, in large part at least, translated into specific policies and/or enforceable law by a determined international community.
I have shown these principles to a wide circle of people concerned with the middle east situation and although some have offered minor modifications, additions, etc. none have disagreed with their validity or the need to have them, or something very similar, recognized in any final resolution of the conflict.
Yet, although the proposed “Roadmap” does touch on some of these matters it is woefully inadequate on most including: the concept of national homelands, a practical basis for negotiating the border adjustments that will have to be applied to the pre-1967 boundaries; recognition that there are Jewish as well as Arab refugees resulting from the events of 1948 and their aftermath; water ; the need, if it is to regain sufficient credibility within Israel to play a significant role in achieving and maintaining peace in the middle east, for the UN to reform its own internal practices and singularly unjust treatment of Israel; and last, but far from least, the problem of increased anti-Semitism whose consequences are being felt world wide.
Process
The rambling discourse on steps - unilateral, bi-lateral, multi-lateral, sequential, simultaneous, etc.- that are presented as the path to peace are too numerous and, in many cases, either too vague or, alternately, too micro-specific to comment on individually. The goals of each of the phases of this process are somewhat more manageable and can be readily summarized. In each case there is a discernable division as between those objectives whose achievement could be reasonably regarded as achievable, given sufficient international pressure led by “The “Quartet”, and those whose institution would be much more dependent on conditions within each of the two states and which, history would seem to indicate, are desirable but not absolutely essential in order to yield some realization of a majority of the six principles and attain the primary goals of two states existing in a situation of mutual recognition and peace.
Accepting “The Roadmap” for what it is purported to be - ie., a pragmatic, reasonable and essentially practical set of measures capable of bringing the current conflict - with its obvious injustices, evident human suffering and, above all, continuing danger to world peace - to an end or, at least, to an acceptable intermediate state of stability, it is important that what is minimally necessary and reasonably do-able be, in fact, identified and carried out.
Phase I - Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services - Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a constitution, and conduct of free, fair and open elections in accord with its stipulations - Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life, withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.
Comments
The first and third objectives of Phase I are more or less within the control of the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The second objective would represent something unique in the Arab world and its accomplishment would probably depend on strong coercion and at least some direct intervention from outside - led, presumably, by “The Quartet” - in order to obviate or overcome opposition from those groups, (e.g., Hamas and those parts of Arafat’s Fatah organization who will see the elections as another step in removing their leader from any meaningful power), likely to view them as antithetical to their own interests.
Phase II - efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution. This will require Palestinian leadership acting decisively against terror, and both willing and able to build a functioning democracy based on tolerance and liberty - with support of “The Quartet” and the broader international community. This, in turn, will depend on “The Quartet’s” assessment of the parties’ Phase I efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions - Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders, in 2003, whose primary goals are: - continued effective security cooperation and performance - continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution building - ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution including formal establishment of the office of prime minister.
Again, there are those objectives which, with international pressure and direct assistance could, with reasonable certainty, be achieved and those whose institution is much more doubtful. The world community, led by “The Quartet” could, almost certainly, identify a government to which could be granted international recognition. It is also possible for the international community to establish provisional borders for a Palestinian state.
There is much less likelihood of ensuring ratification and general acceptance of a democratic constitution, as well as effective institution-building. Inclusion of the words “option” and “possible” are, perhaps, an unstated recognition of this fact.
Phase III - objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli - Palestinian negotiations aimed at agreement of a permanent status agreement in 2005.
It is desirable that, whatever the degree of democracy manifested by institutions established within the Palestinian state, progress towards greater stability and negotiations aimed at a comprehensive, permanent agreement, continue. The one essential factor is that the two states recognize the importance of ending the threats to security and, continue to act - and be seen by each other to be continuing to act - to minimize those threats.
General Conclusion
The value of democracy, constitutional liberties, etc. notwithstanding, peace is simply too important to be put it off until ideal circumstances obtain.
The goals of peace and creation of a viable Palestine capable of undertaking the very considerable economic and social development challenges will face it can be readily assumed. What determines the likelihood of their realization is not the ability to identify or describe them but, rather, the capacity to undertake the measures and establish conditions required for their operation. In this case, the practicalities of “getting there” are far more difficult than choosing where to go.
Were the terms of an ultimate settlement highly esoteric and subtlety nuanced, the ability of “The Quartet” to formulate them would be suspect. But, given the high degree of unanimity as to the contents of that settlement, the sheer ability to apply pressure and supply resources is what is lacking. These are the two commodities that the international community in general and “the Quartet” in particular, are most capable of supplying.
“The Roadmap” is not original. Moreover, its failure to account for some of the principles that will, in the long run, prove essential to any permanent resolution of the conflict and widespread acceptance of that resolution. However, despite all its shortcomings, its very existence and the combination of determination, resources and self-interest that it represents, gives it a reasonably good chance of succeeding.
In essence, “The Roadmap” is not wrong as to destination. That was a given long before it was ever drafted. Its overall direction is also more or less unassailable. Its principle faults are that its destination is too poorly formulated to be a final resting point and, more immediately, that some of the details of its chosen route are unnecessarily elaborate, not readily accessible at this juncture. But these are not fatal.
There was a time when many thought that the future security of the world depended on finding a US government ready, politically able and sufficiently aware of the advantages to its own self-interests to overcome long-standing taboos and ingrained shibboleths that stood in the way of recognizing and establishing a practical working relationship with “Red China”. Few would have predicted that this would ultimately arrive in the form of a Nixon administration. But it did.
There is reason for optimism.
